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KAZAKHSTANI NEO-EURASIANISM AND NAZARBAEV’S ANTI-IMPERIAL FOREIGN POLICY  
 
Luca Anceschi 
(Central & East European Studies, University of Glasgow) 
 
Charismatic leadership – both as a concrete achievement and as an aspirational end – 
represents a recurrent feature in many of the discourses of legitimacy articulated by the state 
propaganda of post-Soviet Kazakhstan.1 The country’s political leadership, it ought to be 
noted, is not up for grabs; Kazakhstani politics, since independence, underwent a process of 
progressive personalisation whereby the presidential figure came to be placed at the core of 
every decision-making mechanism taking place both within and beyond the state’s 
institutional settings.2 Such persistently authoritarian governance cemented the unchallenged 
and, as confirmed by the 2015 elections,3 virtually unchallengeable leadership of Nursultan 
A. Nazarbaev. 
Charismatic leadership occupies an equally important position within Kazakhstan’s 
external policies, and particularly the neo-Eurasianist course pursued internationally by the 
Nazarbaev regime since the mid-1990s. This chapter will make extensive use of the 
expression ‘regime neo-Eurasianism’ to define the ensemble of policy perspectives, agendas, 
and ends incorporated in the Eurasianist rubric inaugurated by the speech delivered by 
Nazarbaev at Moscow State University on 29 March 1994. Kazakhstani Eurasianism, in the 
views of the official propaganda, is inherent part of the third ‘Eurasianist wave’, which had 
reportedly come to the surface after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 4  Its actual 
contribution to the innovation of consolidated interpretations of the evraziistvo idea remains 
questionable; it is hence only a chronological rationale that supports the decision to use the 
label ‘neo-’ to define Nazarbaev’s Eurasianism throughout this chapter. Association with 
traditional Eurasianism, on the other hand, served the Kazakhstani propaganda to bestow 
some theoretical legitimacy upon Nazarbaev’s pragmatic form of Eurasianism. 5 It is the 
adherence of the latter to the policy priorities, pragmatic agendas, and power considerations 
of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian élite that defines more profoundly Kazakhstani neo-
Eurasianism: the use of the term ‘regime’ does hence intend to appropriately place 
Nazarbaev’s neo-evraziistvo within Kazakhstan’s authoritarian politics. 
Regime neo-Eurasianism has to be seen as a policy umbrella that regards charismatic 
leadership as the ultimate function of legitimacy-seeking strategies implemented across 
distinct, yet not unrelated, policy-making environments. At domestic level, the policy’s 
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rhetorical component has focused on the issue of anteriority in neo-Eurasianist thinking, to 
ultimately establish an Eurasianist pedigree for Nazarbaev. The regional facet of regime neo-
Eurasianism endeavoured in turn to promote Kazakhstan as Central Asia’s key integrator, 
addressing the numerous discourses of leadership and hegemony articulated by the state 
propaganda in neighbouring Uzbekistan.6 Kazakhstan’s ambitions of international leadership 
sat at the very core of a further segment of the regime’s image-making strategy. The 
acquisition of the rotating chairmanships of international organisations (the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE; the Organisation of the Islamic Conference – 
OIC), the establishment of empty forms of multilateralism in wider Asia (Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia – CICA), and the incessant pursuit of 
membership in exclusive international bodies (UN Security Council) are integral to the 
specific policy strand that, ultimately, sought to portray the Kazakhstani state – and the 
Nazarbaev regime indirectly – as a recognised international leader.7 
A fourth dimension underpinning Kazakhstan’s legitimacy-obsessed neo-Eurasianism 
relates to the recalibration of the leadership of the numerous multilateral organisations that, 
since 1992, have continuously (re-)defined the political configuration of post-Soviet Eurasia. 
In this context, the efforts put by the Kazakhstani regime encompassed the establishment and 
the promotion of new forms of political and economic association involving the former 
Soviet states and, furthermore, the clear enunciation of associative principles to support this 
alternative model of integration.8 To these ends, Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist rhetoric came 
to incarnate a series of anti-imperial narratives that targeted different audiences across the 
post-Soviet political space. 
Assessing the anti-imperial inclination of regime neo-Eurasianism does have to be 
regarded as the central analytical end pursued by the present chapter. The anti-imperial 
contours of Kazakhstani neo-evraziistvo addressed more in particular those specific forms of 
politico-economic hegemony that the Russian Federation framed across post-Soviet Eurasia 
in multilateral terms, via the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the EvrAziiskoe 
Ekonomicheskoe Soobshchestvo (Eurasian Economy Community - EvrAzEs), and, more 
recently, the Evraziiskii Ekonomicheskii Soyuz (Eurasian Economic Union - EEU). Regime 
neo-Eurasianism, in this sense, featured an anti-imperial disposition insofar as it pursued a 
counter-hegemonic agenda deeply imbued within the logic of authoritarian governance that 
dominates Kazakhstani politics. 
Linkages with the Russian Federation are therefore central to the argument articulated 
here, inasmuch as Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism endeavoured to rethink Eurasian 
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multilateralism by reassessing centre-periphery relations in the former USSR. At rhetorical 
level, Astana’s shifting perceptions of the Kremlin had been informed by specific leadership-
focused narratives, which official propaganda framed in support of Kazakhstan’s neo-
Eurasianist foreign policy. In policy terms, Nazarbaev’s anti-imperial outlook attempted to 
steer – not always successfully, it might be added – the course of Kazakhstan’s bilateral 
relations with the Russian Federation.  
The Kazakhstani perception of Russia’s ambitions of multilateral hegemony will be 
contextualised here within the theoretical and operational policy shifts that have characterised 
regime neo-Eurasianism since its original formulation. In presenting Kazakhstani neo-
Eurasianism as a pragmatically anti-imperial project, this chapter does therefore intend to 
unveil the trajectory through which interrelated questions of power and leadership had come 
to underpin the numerous oscillations emerged within the Russo-Kazakhstani partnership 
from 1992 onwards. To this end, this contribution will place its analytical focus on key 
foreign policy pronouncements made by Nazarbaev in the post-1994 years, dissecting their 
anti-imperial inclinations, tones, and outlook. The pragmatically anti-imperial facet of 
Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianist discourse has been built upon two distinct but by no means 
disconnected narratives, which are respectively focused on integratisya (integration) and 
suvernitet (sovereignty). By examining how the legitimacy/foreign policy nexus permeated 
these intersecting discourses, this chapter will put forward an alternative reading of the anti-
imperial and counter-hegemonic connotation that continues to permeate regime neo-
Eurasianism. The analytical issue of continuity and change is thus central to the argument 
articulated here. The contrast between Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism and Russia’s hegemonic 
multilateralism will be analysed in time, to ultimately reveal that, with the return of Vladimir 
V. Putin to the Kremlin in 2012, this conflicting relationship evolved into the juxtaposition of 
two essentially pragmatic forms of neo-Eurasianism. 
This contribution is ultimately based on the presentation of three snapshots in which 
twin narratives of integratsiya and suvernitet accompanied the establishment or, at other 
junctures, the disintegration of a number of Eurasian multilateral organisations that included, 
in different capacities, both Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Here, textual analysis 
will be intimately connected to the study of actual policy, in order to contextualise the 
Eurasian prong of Kazakhstani-sponsored multilateralism within the emergence, 
consolidation, and evolution of anti-imperial narratives that have characterised Kazakhstan’s 
regime rhetoric since the mid-1990s. Empirical focus will be directed throughout the three 
organisations that more ostensibly attempted to reintegrate the economies of post-Soviet 
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Eurasia: the Evraziiskii Soyuz (Eurasian Union), the EvrAzEs, and the EEU. It is precisely 
through the institutionalisation of this latter organisation – arguably the most significant 
development in post-Soviet regionalism to have emerged in the last 20 years – that the 
originally anti-imperial disposition of regime neo-Eurasianism failed more visibly, as the 
analysis of post-Crimea evolutions of the Russo-Kazakhstani relationship will ultimately 
demonstrate. 
 
Snapshot One: The 1994 Moscow Speech and the Evraziiskii Soyuz 
A cursory look at the geopolitical context that surrounded Nazarbaev’s first Moscow speech9 
captures most appropriately the anti-imperial undertone that permeated what is generally 
regarded as the foundational document of Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism. The speech, which 
followed by a few months the disintegration of the rublevaya zona (November 1993), 
embodied Kazakhstan’s tangible disillusion with the integrationist model promoted through 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 10  The apparent objective pursued by 
Nazarbaev in the speech related to the launch of the Evraziiskii Soyuz (EAS), an overly vague 
and generally unstructured multilateral organisation that sought the politico-economic 
reintegration of post-Soviet Eurasia. At the time, Kazakhstani policy-makers adopted a very 
restrictive definition of the geographical constituents of the Eurasian political space, narrowly 
focusing their understanding of the EAS organisational remit on the CIS area.11 
Operationally, the EAS is best described as a total failure. Nazarbaev’s Soyuz was 
received with scarce enthusiasm by Uzbekistan and Russia – the two partners that the speech 
explicitly singled out as the key constituents of the EAS.12 No policy preparation preceded 
the launch of the EAS; no substantive policy drive supported post-speech institutionalisation: 
the Evraziiski Soyuz remained in this sense a largely irrelevant forum vis-à-vis post-Soviet re-
integratsiya. It is this organisation’s rhetorical dimension that needs to be analysed more 
closely to locate the speech’s counter-hegemonic agenda within the Kazakhstani neo-
Eurasianist continuum. 
In outlining the principles upon which to build the EAS, Nazarbaev referred to 
dobrovol’nosti (free will) and ravnopraviya (equality of rights). Rather than focusing on the 
specific integrationist disposition carried out through the Evraziiskii Soyuz, Nazarbaev 
deliberately concentrated on the fundamental principles to be followed while accessing the 
EAS. Membership in this organisation was meant to be voluntary and thus genuinely 
unconstrained. In Nazarbaev’s views, upholding the principle of non-interference was 
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ultimately meant to guarantee the sovereignty (suvernitet) of the member states. In post-
Crimea Eurasia, this specific emphasis has come to acquire an even greater relevance. 13 
The Kazakhstani president tailored the first Moscow speech around the political 
imperative of recalibrating the leadership of Eurasian integration away from the Russian 
Federation. Not surprisingly, quasi exclusive focus on accession principles prevented 
Nazarbaev from elaborating upon the specific policy areas that the EAS was meant to 
integrate: a brief passage on the creation of a unified economic space (formirovanie edinogo 
eknomicheskogo prostranstva) and the establishment of a common defence strategy 
(obespechenie sovmestnoi oboronnoi politiki) represented the speech’s only specific mentions 
of the policy areas that the EAS purported to integrate. Interestingly, the speech clarified how 
the EAS would relate to the CIS: Nazarbaev’s Soyuz was not to be seen as a mere 
replacement for the Commonwealth, insofar as its (allegedly) revolutionary associative 
outlook meant to improve the patterns of inter-state cooperation that were already in place 
across the post-Soviet region.14 This specific argument facilitated Nazarbaev in advancing 
another important point: as Russia remained15 at the time Kazakhstan’s most crucial partner 
(at least in economic terms), 16  the prospected amendment of Eurasia’s multilateral 
configuration inscribed in EAS institutionalisation was not ultimately intended as a driver for 
change within the Almaty-Moscow bilateral relationship. 
This cursory analysis of the 1994 Moscow speech stimulates three key observations 
on the anti-imperial outlook that regime neo-Eurasianism had come to display at its very 
onset. To begin with, the speech envisaged an alternative configuration for Eurasian 
multilateralism. By outlining a union of equal partners, Nazarbaev suggested that Russia 
would recede back into the fold of post-Soviet states, while Kazakhstan would progressively 
emerge as the leading integrator in the post-Soviet region. 
Systematic failure to outline a structured integrationist plan has to be seen as a 
deliberate component of the speech: in Nazarbaev’s narrative – which was to become a focal 
point for Kazakhstan’s post-1994 foreign policy propaganda – the perception of leadership is 
intrinsically more important than leadership itself. This proposition contextualises with 
greater precision the very limited policy drive that supported EAS institutionalisation from 
mid-1994 onwards. More than a genuine integrationist forum, the Evraziiskii Soyuz came in 
this sense to represent a vehicle for Nazarbaev’s leadership ambitions.  
These two preliminary conclusions support a clearer delineation of the rejuvenating 
neo-Eurasianist impetus allegedly inscribed in the Moscow speech. The Kazakhstani neo-
Eurasianist push of the mid-1990s remained a purely rhetorical construct in both policy and 
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ideological terms. In relation to policy, the Nazarbaev regime failed to follow up in any 
significant way on the launch the Evraziiskii Soyuz. At the ideological level, while neo-
Eurasianist themes began to surface with some regularity in the Kazakhstani regime 
narratives of the mid-1990s,17  the ultimate failure to operationalise the EAS led to this 
organisation’s exclusion from Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianist propaganda, which continued in 
this sense to be narrowly focused on the glorification of the presidential persona. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the profoundly rhetorical outlook of the first 
Moscow speech conferred Nazarbaev’s counter-hegemonic rhetoric a surprisingly pro-
Russian disposition, inscribing a paradoxical undertone at the core of the policy ensemble 
operating under Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist rubric. Regime neo-Eurasianism, since its very 
onset, was never meant to alienate the Kremlin: the president’s pragmatism, in this sense, 
aspired to centre the Eurasian multilateral system – at the time narrowly confined to the 
territory of the former Soviet Union – on a solid Russo-Kazakhstani axis. How to reconcile 
solid bilateral linkages with the apparently counter-hegemonic agenda pursued by 
Nazarbaev’s calls for a more equal form of post-Soviet re-integratsiya? The next segment 
began to delineate the contours of the answer to this question, addressing one of the key 
concerns of the present contribution. 
 
 
Snapshot Two: The EvrAzEs as a neo-Eurasianist Tandem 
A peculiar – although not entirely unpredictable – evolution in the anti-imperial outlook of 
Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism crystallised in the mid-2000s. On 7 October 2005, at a summit 
held in Sankt Petersburg, the leaders of the Tsentral’naya Aziya Sotrudinchestvo (TsAS) 
sanctioned the dissolution of the organisation by endorsing the confluence of all member 
states in the EvrAzEs. 18  President Nazarbaev presented the dissolution of TsAs as his 
personal foreign policy triumph: EvrAzEs enlargement, in Nazarbaev’s views, had come to 
incarnate the success encountered internationally by his neo-Eurasianist vision.19 
Before the 2005 enlargement, the integrationist agenda promoted through the 
EvrAzEs framework featured a predominantly functionalist outlook, as this organisation 
aimed at first to develop the Customs Union and, between 2003 and the eruption of the 
Orange Revolution (November 2004), sought to incorporate Ukraine in a Common Economic 
Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.20 The enlargement of EvrAzEs hence represents 
the political juncture at which two usually alternative forms of neo-Eurasianism – namely 
those elaborated by the Nazarbaev regime on the one hand and the first Putin Administration 
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on the other – came to display a relatively converging outlook. Ultimately, this might be seen 
as a rather surprising development, given the counter-hegemonic tones that had frequently 
characterised regime neo-Eurasianism throughout 1994-2005 and the mildly reassertive 
foreign policy stand that the Kremlin had come to adopt in the early 2000s. 
The timidly Eurasianist inclination that Putin displayed in his first term in office 
(2000-2004) led to the implementation of an agenda of reassertion, which the Kremlin 
framed across the post-Soviet space through a series of “more active and arguably more 
successful” 21  multilateral organisations, including the EvrAzEs. 22  Putin’s embryonic 
evraziistvo was in this sense very pragmatic, and narrowly centred its attention on post-Soviet 
re-integratsiya – a policy area on which Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism had been obsessively 
focusing since the mid-1990s. Putin’s earlier Eurasianist forays were at the same time 
relatively conservative; Russia limited to reinstate its leadership in the post-Soviet space 
without attempting to revolutionise the multilateral, geopolitical, and geo-economic 
configuration that the region had acquired before Putin’s accession to power.23  
Russia’s new assertiveness was not seen in Astana as a direct challenge to the ends 
pursued by Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianism. It was Kazakhstan’s leadership-obsessed foreign 
policy that stimulated most decisively the temporary marriage of neo-Eurasianist 
convenience celebrated in 2005 through EvrAzEs institutionalisation. There is perhaps no 
better way to capture the ultimate sense of the prior proposition than by analysing the 
speech24 that N.A. Nazarbaev delivered at the first summit of the revamped EvrAzEs, held in 
Sankt Petersburg on 25 January 2006. In this context, the Kazakhstani president focused at 
length on the specific implications held by Uzbekistan’s accession to the organisation. In 
Nazarbaev’s words, the Uzbek membership in EvrAzEs had the potential to ‘open new 
opportunities to put into practice the idea of Eurasian integration […] and enhance the global 
credibility of the Eurasian Economic Community’. 
Was Nazarbaev’s speech a show of Central Asian solidarity, as it welcomed 
Uzbekistan back into the Eurasian fold? It might be more reasonable to suggest that, in this 
context, the narrative advanced by the Kazakhstani president targeted the same end pursued 
in his 1994 Moscow speech, namely the recalibration of multilateral leadership across post-
Soviet Eurasia. To be properly understood, rhetorical emphasis on the Uzbek accession has to 
be placed within Nazarbaev’s composite characterisation of the EvrAzEs. On the one hand, 
EvrAzEs was regarded as the legitimate incarnation of Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianist 
initsiativa, insofar as it represented the direct descendant of the defunct Evraziskii Soyuz – a 
multilateral framework to which, as we have seen earlier, Uzbekistan had never subscribed. 
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At the same time, EvrAzEs – after the dismantlement of TsAS – had come to represent the 
only institutional umbrella to which all Central Asian republics (with the notable exception of 
Turkmenistan) had subscribed. Nazarbaev’s 2006 speech, in this sense, subtly remarked that 
Uzbekistan was entering an Eurasian integrationist framework led in tandem by Kazakhstan 
and, most interestingly, the Russian Federation. To this end, Nazarbaev clearly identified two 
policy areas – namely nuclear cooperation (ispol’zovaniya atomnoi energii) and monetary 
integration (ob organizatsii integrirovannogo valyutovo rynka) – in which a Russo-
Kazakhstani axis could stimulate the future progress of the EvrAzEs.  
This particular lens might help explaining the conspicuous absence, from Nazarbaev’s 
2006 speech, of any substantive reference to the suvernitet of EvrAzEs member states and to 
the imperative importance that non-interference held vis-à-vis association practices in the 
EvrAzEs framework. Values and principles that in 1994 appeared to be indispensible to the 
full execution of Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianist agenda had in this sense disappeared from the 
version of Kazakhstani neo-evraziistvo that crystallised in the mid-2000s. The 2006 speech 
deliberately centred Eurasian integration on a solid partnership connecting Astana with 
Moscow: Kazakhstani foreign policy rhetoric, in this sense, can be said to have completed a 
parabolic evolution in which the Kremlin – which in the early post-Soviet era was seen as 
Central Asia’s ‘authoritative uncle’25 – had come to be regarded as an indispensible partner 
for the translation of Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianist idea into a definitely more structured – as 
well as Kazakhstani-led – multilateral initsiativa. The political facet of this evolutionary 
process manifested itself as early as August 2000, 26  when, at a TsAES summit held in 
Bishkek, Nazarbaev enthusiastically endorsed a declaration that assigned to Russia a central 
role in the management of Central Asia’s security structures. In economic terms, the (re-
)emergence of Russo-Kazakhstani bilateralism came to be portrayed as a decisive factor in 
Eurasian economic cooperation: Nazarbaev’s Sankt Petersburg speech singled out the 
establishment of the Eurasian Development Bank, finalised in January 2006,  as a practical 
manifestation of the partnership’s beneficial contribution to EvrAzEs integration. 
The 2006 speech, to a very significant extent, captures rhetorically the policy 
alignment between the mid-2000s version of regime neo-Eurasianism and the set of Eurasian 
strategies put into practice by the first Putin Administration. With Putin’s accession to power, 
Russo-Kazakhstani bilateral ties had received a new impulse.27 At multilateral level, this new 
stage in the partnership was mirrored by the sustained economic action through which Putin 
attempted to reinvigorate Russia’s presence in the former Soviet space. 28  Nazarbaev’s 
rhetorical (re-)appropriation of the EvrAzEs was profoundly congruent with this policy 
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context, insofar as it allowed Kazakhstani propaganda to articulate a discourse of neo-
Eurasianist leadership that matched the pragmatic expectations held by the Kremlin in the 
Eurasian geo-political landscape. This specific context, ultimately, offers a more precise 
characterisation of the temporary dilution that the anti-imperial undertones of regime neo-
Eurasianism had come to experience in the early- and mid-2000s.  
The analysis of the policy snapshot related to EvrAzEs enlargement, and most 
importantly to the latter’s impact on the anti-imperial agenda pursued by Kazakhstani neo-
Eurasianism, hence suggested three critically important conclusions. To begin with, 
Nazarbaev seems to have abandoned, temporarily at least, his characteristic emphasis on 
sovereignty, while framing a revised version of the official Kazakhstani discourse on 
integratsiya. Change in the rhetorical component of regime neo-Eurasianism reflected wider 
shifts in Kazakhstan’s perception of the role that Moscow was playing in post-Soviet Eurasia. 
The mid-2000s version of Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist rhetoric came to feature a less 
markedly counter-hegemonic outlook, perhaps in response to the marginally imperial agenda 
pursued in post-Soviet Eurasia by the first Putin Administration.  
In another major departure from the content of the Moscow speech, the mid-2000s 
version of regime neo-Eurasianism also ceased to focus obsessively on the specific 
associative principles upon which to build a discourse of integratsiya in Eurasia. This is not 
to however say that Kazakhstani policy-makers had turned their attention to the formulation 
of specific integrationist measures: the eventual failure of the EvrAzEs is directly related to 
the perpetuation of the chaotic modus operandi that regulated the institutional settings of the 
CIS (or those emerged, at Central Asian level, within the TsAS framework). 
Finally, the establishment of a neo-Eurasianist axis between Astana and Moscow 
exerted a durable impact upon the associative praxis crystallising across post-Soviet Eurasia. 
From 2000 onwards, the segment of Nazarbaev’s initsiativa that focussed on the former 
Soviet Union was to be exclusively centred on an institutional continuum – namely the 
EvrAzEs/Customs Union/EEU – that had at its very core the Russo-Kazakhstani partnership. 
The specific posture that Russia adopted in post-Soviet Eurasia during the first Putin 
presidency and in the Medvedev interim (2008-2012) led Kazakhstani policy-makers to 
frame a targeted discourse of (re-)integratsiya in which sovereignty lost the centrality it 
occupied during the El’tsin years. This dynamics was to change dramatically as Putin 




Snapshot Three: Post-Crimea neo-Eurasianism and the Suvernitet Conundrum 
The policy manifesto that opened Putin’s second presidential term did unequivocally identify 
Eurasia as the key geopolitical focus for Russia’s post-2011 foreign policy. In promoting the 
institutionalisation of the EEU via a specific article published on the Izvestiya during the final 
stages of his Prime Ministership,29 V.V. Putin set into motion a process through which Russia 
endeavoured to reappropriate a set of key foreign policy concepts that had traditionally been 
integral to the discourses of integratsiya formulated by post-Soviet Kazakhstan. The article 
was inherent part of Putin’s electoral campaign, and served as a blueprint for the foreign 
policy strategy to be implemented by the Russian Federation after the election. 
Did the article ultimately open a new phase in Putin neo-Eurasianism30? The structure 
of the piece, to start with, was congruent with the tradition of pragmatic integrationism that 
had often characterised Kazakhstan’s evraziiskaya strategiya. Emphasis on functionalism 
underpinned the Izvestiya piece just as it did with many of Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianist 
speeches, replicating the operational vagueness that had often permeated official declarations 
on Kazakhstani multilateralism. Through this article, the Russian leader solemnly – and, with 
the privilege of hindsight, surprisingly – reinstated the importance that state sovereignty held 
vis-à-vis EEU association, by remarking that a prospective member ‘must only join on its 
sovereign decision based on its long-term national interests’. The article aspired on the other 
hand to introduce Putin as the leader of post-Soviet multilateralism, insofar as it purportedly 
established an institutional continuum between the EEU and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States – an ultimately moribund integrationist project that, since 1991, had been 
indisputably led by the Russian Federation. The Izvestiya piece, finally, ambitiously 
attempted to place the EEU in a more global context, briefly addressing the engagement 
options available to this organisation to relate to analogous multilateral institutions located in 
both West (European Union) and East (Asia-Pacific Economic Community - APEC; 
Association of Southeast Asia Nations - ASEAN). 
Putin’s neo-Eurasianism, at least in the version outlined in the Izvestiya editorial, had 
hence come to pose specific challenges to the leadership agenda pursued by Kazakhstani 
foreign policy-makers in post-Soviet Eurasia. In 2010, the OSCE Chairmanship contributed 
to elevate Nazarbaev’s profile as an internationally recognised leader.31 In 2011-2012, the 
second rise of Putin endeavoured to significantly constrain the ambitions of Eurasian 
leadership held by the Kazakhstani president.  It is therefore not unsurprising that Nazarbaev, 
less than a month after the publication of Putin’s article, authored a parallel Izvestiya 
commentary, in which he proceeded to illustrate his own understanding of the future 
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multilateral configuration of post-Soviet Eurasia.32 Nazarbaev’s Izvestiya article was in turn 
very optimistic about the functionalist development of the EEU, which was presented by the 
Kazakhstani leader as an economic “megaproject” adequately placed to respond to present 
and future challenges. This optimism was destined to wane with the eruption of the Crimean 
crisis, an event that would only amplify the significance of the multifaceted challenges that 
the neo-Eurasianist impetus of the second Putin Administration had come to pose to the full 
execution of Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist agenda. 
Since the mid-1990s, a significant segment of Kazakhstan’s official propaganda had 
focused, with quasi obsessive regularity, on the crucial importance held by the first Moscow 
speech vis-à-vis the establishment of a neo-Eurasianist strand in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
strategy. To celebrate the 20th anniversary of this allegedly seminal speech, N.A. Nazarbaev 
planned a trip to Moscow to deliver a lecture on Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism, with the 
deliberate view to reinvigorate his credentials as Eurasia’s key integrator. The speech was to 
be originally delivered in late March 2014. In the tumultuous settings that emerged from 
Crimea’s annexation, Kazakhstani officials were not only forced to postpone the presidential 
trip but, most importantly, had to rethink the speech’s contents and its fundamental tone. 
There is no political statement than captures with greater precision the mood in post-Crimea 
Eurasia than Nazarbaev’s second Moscow speech, delivered at Moscow State University on 
28 April 2014 – only four weeks prior to the signature of the trilateral Treaty establishing the 
EEU, ratified in Astana on 29 May 2014.33 The speech was framed as a further response to 
Putin’s Izvestiya article and, simultaneously, intended to situate a Kazakhstani-led 
integratsiya discourse within the geopolitics of post-Crimea Eurasia.  
In his 2014 speech, Nazarbaev advanced two main points to address Putin’s apparent 
attempts to hijack the paternity of post-Soviet integratsiya. To begin with, the speech 
elaborated at length on Kazakhstan’s official views on the origins of the protracted and – in 
Nazarbaev’s own words – deeply flawed process that led to the (then) imminent 
institutionalisation of the EEU. Since its very onset, the speech had made abundantly clear 
that the Eurasian Economic Union had to be regarded as a direct descendant of the Evraziiskii 
Soyuz – the organisation that Nazarbaev launched at MSU in 1994. Nazarbaev’s neo-
Eurasianist initsiativa ‘changed the nature (kharakter) [of] and gave dynamism (dinamizm)’ 
to the CIS, building on the Commonwealth to create a revised – and in the long-term more 
successful – integrative forum. Yet again, the logic of leadership recalibration came to 
permeate a major presidential pronouncement on neo-Eurasianist integratsiya. At the same 
time, markedly anti-imperial tones resurfaced to characterise the presidential rhetoric, as 
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Nazarbaev reprised one of the key themes of his 1992 speech, namely the importance of 
unconstrained access to EEU integration. Here, the Kazakhstani president made a deliberate 
point to reinstate that the principles of dobrovol’nosti and ravnopraviya underpinned his 
integratsiya vision in 2014, just as they did it in 1994. Renewed emphasis on accession 
procedures – which as we have seen constituted very marginal rhetorical concerns in the 
statements of the mid-2000s – is not accidental: post-Crimea Eurasia had become an 
inhospitable milieu for the leaderships governing the former Soviet periphery. It is through 
the interrelated concepts of suvernitet and gosudarstvenost’ (statehood) that the speech aimed 
to bring together the dual rhetoric of integratsiya and leadership: Nazarbaev, in addressing 
his Moscow audience, deliberately remarked that Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist initsiativa 
had always taken into account the sovereignty and independence (nezavisimost’) of 
prospective partners. This was the point that, in the president’s rhetorical framework, was 
instrumental to deliberately open a gulf between regime neo-Eurasianism, the imperial 
integration fostered in the Soviet era, and, most importantly, the post-Crimea, and hence neo-
imperial, version of Putin’s evraziistvo.  
The second Moscow speech failed to include, perhaps not accidentally, explicit anti-
Russian tones: the Astana-Moscow axis, in Nazarbaev’s words, remained a model for 
bilateral relations around the globe. Kazakhstan’s decision-makers, throughout the post-
Crimea years, may be said to have followed this approach at policy level with some 
consistency. While the intensity of the Russo-Kazakhstani bilateral relationship managed to 
remain high, the post-Crimea configuration of Eurasian multilateralism lost much of its 
momentum. Although Kazakhstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union as a full partner in 
May 2014, effective integration in the EEU stumbled across many problems, including 
Kazakhstan’s reluctance to deepen cooperation in specific policy areas 34  and, most 
importantly, the eruption of trade wars35 between the partners. The political reality of the 
post-2014 years, in this sense, obliterated the economic optimism that characterised the 
vision of EEU integration outlined by Nazarbaev in this Izvestiya commentary. 
To all intents and purposes, the second Moscow speech did not rest upon a rhetorical 
infrastructure much dissimilar from that which permeated Nazarbaev’s first MSU statement. 
Does this proposition somehow imply that Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism had remained a 
static policy framework for more than two decades? 
Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianism has consistently adhered to those set of power 
technologies designed by the regime to operate externally to the Kazakhstani state. This 
might explain the policy’s obsession with leadership, and its incessant pursue of rhetorical 
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ends designed in glorification of Nazarbaev, his achievements, and his historic role as 
Kazakhstan’s first leader. This policy line remained firmly at the core of regime neo-
Eurasianism for twenty years. What did ultimately change, on the other hand, it is the 
geopolitical environment in which the policy had to operate: Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism 
was designed in a nominally hostile milieu, in which Russia’s imperial legacies led decision-
makers in Almaty to draw a new institutional map for post-Soviet Eurasia. While it 
developed in a somehow friendlier environment – and this might explain the temporary 
dilution of counter-hegemonic tones that emerged in the mid-2000s – regime neo-
Eurasianism has since the eruption of the Crimea crisis returned to operate at a juncture at 
which Russia adopted a newly assertive posture in Eurasia.  
It is the cyclical evolution of post-Soviet geopolitics that hence explains the 
fundamental similarities between the two Moscow speeches and, on a wider perspective, the 
differences between the forms of neo-Eurasianism sponsored by the Nazarbaev regime and 
the second Putin Administration. This lens, at the same time, does very appropriately allow 
us to reconsider the recent sovereignty-focused diatribe between Nazarbaev and Putin – a 
dispute that had some apparent neo-Eurasianist implications.  
In a speech36 delivered to the 2014 National Youth Forum in Seliger (Tver oblast’), 
V.V. Putin made a series of oddly double-edged remarks about his Kazakhstani counterpart. 
On the one hand, he proceeded to recognise Nazarbaev as a sophisticated (gramotnyi) 
political operator and the original mind behind the creating of the EEU, echoing in this sense 
the key themes addressed by the Kazakhstani president in his Izvestiya piece as well as in the 
second MSU speech.  On the other, Putin went as far as questioning the ultimate raison 
d’être of the Kazakhstani state, remarking that the Kazakhs never enjoyed statehood (u 
kazakhov ne bylo nikogda gosudarvennosti) before Nazarbaev’s accession to power.  Nate 
Schenkkan37 and Marlene Laruelle38 have written extensively about the Kazakhstani reaction 
to the comments made by Putin on Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, and have successfully placed 
them in their contextualisation of the EEU’s declining institutional efficacy. Interestingly, the 
Selinger comments had major impacts on the three rhetorical narratives – suvernitet, 
integratsiya, leadership – that, as we have seen throughout this chapter, sit at the very heart of 
regime neo-Eurasianism. Shenkkan and Laruelle, indirectly yet not unconvincingly, related 
the Salinger comments to the suvernitet and integratsiya narratives, explaining in this sense 
the domestic39 and EEU-specific implications of Kazakhstan’s highly rhetorical response to 
Putin’s remarks. So far as those narratives focussing on Nazarbaev’s leadership, the Selinger 
comments, by questioning Kazakhstani statehood, did indirectly probe the legitimacy of the 
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Kazakhstani president: if Kazakhstani statehood is somehow questionable, can we regard his 
president as a legitimate leader? Framing an adequate answer to this question does represent 
one of the most pressing foreign policy challenges that Kazakhstan will face in the post-
Crimea years.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Since the mid-1990s, the projection of Kazakhstan as a leader in Eurasia crystallised as a 
central concern for the strand of neo-Eurasianism promoted by N.A. Nazarbaev and his 
associates. Kazakhstani neo-evraziistvo came to feature a constantly inclusionary disposition, 
playing a key role in the periodic reconfigurations of the Eurasian political space that came to 
the fore after the establishment, or alternatively the dismissal, of multilateral organisations 
attempting to re-integrate the former USSR. The nature of Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism 
hence led policy-makers in Almaty/Astana to reconceptualise centre-periphery relations in 
the former Soviet Union, placing Kazakhstan’s linkages with the Russian Federation at the 
core of the re-integrationist efforts made by the Nazarbaev regime. No integrationist initiative 
that excluded Russia, in this sense, was seen as viable by the leadership in Astana, given the 
peculiar domestic agenda attached to Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist foreign policy. 
As it had to respond to the logic of authoritarian stability that traditionally dominated 
Kazakhstani politics and policy-making, Nazarbaev’s neo-Eurasianism acquired a distinctive 
regime-centred orientation, serving in this sense many of the pragmatic purposes connected 
with the power technologies devised by the élite in Astana. This chapter identified the 
discursive legitimation of the Eurasian leadership of Nursultan Nazarbaev as one of the key 
objectives that Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist foreign policy has pursued since the 1990s. In 
this context, the neo-Eurasianist re-interpretation of Kazakhstan’s relationship with the 
former Soviet hegemon – the Russian Federation – emerged as a concern wielding 
particularly significant influence over the legitimacy agenda of the Nazarbaev regime. 
Revisiting centre-periphery linkages across the Eurasian political space with a view to 
enhance Nazarbaev’s legitimacy as Eurasia’s key integrator led regime neo-Eurasianism – the 
brand of neo-eraziistvo promoted by post-Soviet Kazakhstan – to develop a relatively marked 
counter-hegemonic outlook. Anti-imperial tones, as this chapter has argued, came to 
characterise some of the most important neo-Eurasianist pronouncements that Nazarbaev 
made since the launch of Kazakhstan’s evraziiskaya strategiya.  Emphasis on the equality of 
rights held by the states integrating their economies across Eurasia and, most importantly, on 
the significance that sovereignty continues to hold in post-Soviet forms of integratsiya 
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underpinned the anti-imperial discourses through which Nazarbaev came to describe 
Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism. Exclusive focus on suvernitet and equality of rights, at the 
same time, is not sufficient to justify the anti-imperial characterisation that this chapter made 
of regime neo-Eurasianism. More precisely, it is the latter’s unrelenting focus on leadership 
that delineates with greater precision the counter-hegemonic contours of Kazakhstan’s neo-
Eurasianist policy.  
While predicating the stipulation of new associative principles to regulate post-Soviet 
(re-)integratsiya, Kazakhstan’s neo-Eurasianist discourse did actually intend to highlight the 
imprint of Nazarbaev’s leadership over these allegedly innovative principles. In the views of 
the official propaganda, Kazakhstani-sponsored integrationism – which unfolded in a 
multilateral continuum stretching from the Evraziiskii Soyuz to the Eurasian Economic Union 
– intended to promote an alternative concept of Eurasia, in which Russia was to act as a 
partner and not as a leader. The latter proposition might explain why Nazarbaev’s neo-
Eurasianist speeches came to regularly focus on leadership re-calibration vis-à-vis Eurasia’s 
multilateral configuration, by minimising the regional relevance of Russia-centric 
organisations (CIS), promoting the rebalancing of their leadership (EvrAzEs), or highlighting 
the Kazakhstani input in their initial establishment (EEU). This composite strategy of 
recalibration appears to be thoroughly consistent with, and profoundly inspired by, the 
image-making ends that have often permeated the Kazakhstani process of foreign policy-
making. 
Constant focus on leadership recalibration forced Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism to 
continuously renegotiate its multilateral outlook with the Russian Federation. This chapter 
outlined Russia’s evolving perception of post-Soviet integratsiya, suggesting that the 
Kremlin’s neo-Eurasianism, due to its essentially pragmatic agenda, has often clashed with 
the leadership-obsessed agenda promoted by Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism. The temporary 
realignment of the mid-2000s lost much relevance as the EvrAzEs evolved into the Eurasian 
Economic Union, a Putin-dominated integrative framework that, especially in the post-
Crimea years, simply ignored the associative principles reportedly inspired by Nazarbaev. 
The alternation of hegemonic and anti-hegemonic multilateralism across post-Soviet 
Eurasia led in this sense to the crystallisation of the EEU as the region’s key integrationist 
forum. Notwithstanding its apparent interest in reaching out to Turkey and Vietnam, the EEU 
remains an essentially post-Soviet club. The obsessive focus that policy-makers in Astana 
placed on the president’s discursive leadership led Kazakhstani neo-evraziistvo to narrowly 
focus its perception of Eurasia to the post-Soviet space: the anti-imperial narratives illustrated 
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in this chapter suggested that Nazarbaev’s leadership ambitions were exclusively formulated 
vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. Regime neo-Eurasianism may be expected to pursue 
legitimacy-focused agendas for much of Nazarbaev’s residual time in charge: however 
alternative and innovative Kazakhstani neo-Eurasianism might actually be, its 
operationalisation is hence likely to be confined a relatively small segment of the wider 
Eurasian region.  
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